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Monetary and Fiscal Policy Efficiency and Coordination in an Open-
Economy General Equilibrium Model with Three Production Sectors 
 






    The paper analyzes monetary and fiscal policy efficiency and coordination in a stochastic 
new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model with three production sectors. Some or 
all of these sectors can be affected by unanticipated productivity shocks which can trigger 
monetary and fiscal policy reactions. The uncertainty over the shocks can be symmetric or 
asymmetric across the two countries. 
    The paper first  aims  to  assess  the capacity of fiscal  and monetary policy to  reduce or 
eliminate the negative effects of unanticipated productivity shocks. Second, it evaluates the 
possible gains from international monetary cooperation as well as the impact of active fiscal 
policy on monetary policy efficiency. 
    The results show that monetary and fiscal policies are efficient tools of stabilization and 
under  several  conditions  they  can  replicate  the  flexible-price  equilibrium.  However,  their 
efficiency is not necessarily increased when both monetary and fiscal policies react to shocks 
at the national level. The existence of bilateral gains from monetary cooperation depends on 
the  degree  of  asymmetry  concerning  the  uncertainty  over  the  shocks.  In  case  of  high 
asymmetry, monetary cooperation can be counter-productive either for the home or for the 
foreign country. 
 
JEL Classification: E63, F41, F42 









L’efficacit￩ et la coordination internationale des politiques mon￩taires 
et budg￩taires dans un mod￨le d’￩quilibre général à trois secteurs de 
production 
 





    Cet article analyse l’efficacit￩ et la coordination internationale des politiques monétaires et 
budgétaire  dans  un  modèle  stochastique  d’￩quilibre  g￩n￩ral  qui  décrit  deux  économies 
interdépendantes  comprenant  chacune  trois  secteurs  de  production.  Tous  ces  secteurs  ou 
certains d’entre eux peuvent ￪tre affect￩s par des chocs de productivit￩s non anticip￩s qui 
peuvent déclencher des réactions des autorités monétaires et budgétaires. L’incertitude sur la 
survenance de ces chocs peut être la même dans les deux pays ou elle peut diff￩rer d’un pays 
à l’autre. 
     L’article ￩tudie d’abord la capacit￩ dont disposent les politiques mon￩taires et budg￩taires 
de r￩duire ou d’￩liminer les effets n￩gatifs des chocs de productivit￩. Puis, il évalue les gains 
éventuels que peut engendrer une coopération monétaire internationale et les incidences que 
peuvent avoir les politiques budg￩taires actives sur l’efficacit￩ des politiques mon￩taires. 
    L’analyse montre que les politiques  mon￩taires  et  budg￩taires  constituent  des  outils  de 
stabilisation efficaces et qu’elles peuvent, sous certaines conditions, r￩sorber enti￨rement les 
effets négatifs des chocs sur le bien-être. Leur efficacit￩ n’est cependant pas n￩cessairement 
accrue si elles sont mises en œuvre en m￪me temps en r￩action aux chocs. L’existence de 
gains  provenant  de  la  coopération  monétaire  internationale  et  bénéficiant  aux  deux  pays 
d￩pend du degr￩ d’asym￩trie de l’incertitude sur les chocs. En cas de forte asym￩trie, la 
coopération  monétaire  peut  devenir  contre-productive  pour  l’un  ou  l’autre  pays,  ce  qui 
conduit les deux pays à adopter des stratégies non-coopératives. 
 
Classification du JEL: E63, F41, F42 
Mots-clés: Stabilisation, coopération monétaire internationale, politique monétaire, politique 
                  budgétaire. 
 
  
Monetary and Fiscal Policy Efficiency and Coordination in an Open-
Economy General Equilibrium Model with Three Production Sectors 
 






    Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) extend the deterministic new open economy macroeconomics 
(NOEM) model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) to a stochastic environment. According to the 
authors, this extension has the objective of providing the first analytical workhorse model that 
allows  to  determine  with  precision  the  impact  of  uncertainty  in  two-country  general 
equilibrium  models.  Furthermore,  the  authors  provide  a  welfare-based  analysis  of 
macroeconomic policy as a stabilization tool. They use this new framework to analyze the 
efficiency and coordination of monetary policy based on simple rules. Their results are similar 
to those suggested by traditional models such the ones analyzed by Canzoneri and Henderson 
(1991): gains from international monetary cooperation are generally absent or negligible.   
    This conclusion is reconsidered by Canzoneri et al. (2005) who extend Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2002) by introducing three different production sectors in each country in order to take into 
account  the  empirically  observed  Balassa-Samuelson  effect.  They  find  that  monetary 
cooperation gains may be non-negligible.  
    Lombardo  and  Sutherland  (2004)  extend  Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (2002)  by  incorporating 
fiscal  policies  along  monetary  policies  in  a  setup  with  only  one  production  sector.  They 
conclude that both monetary and fiscal policy are efficient tools for stabilization. Moreover, 
international  monetary  cooperation  under  price  rigidity  reproduces  the  flexible-price 
equilibrium regardless of the fiscal regime.  
    The  present  paper  analyzes  the  interactions  between  monetary  and  fiscal  policy,  like 
Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), as well as their impact on the efficiency of one another. For 
this, we incorporate fiscal policy alongside monetary policy in the framework proposed by 
Canzoneri et al (2005). As such, we obtain a model that is sufficiently simple and tractable for 
analyzing both fiscal and monetary policy issues.   
    We use this framework to analyze, first, the efficiency of fiscal and monetary policy as a 
stabilization tool. Specifically, we assess the capacity of fiscal and monetary policy to reduce or eliminate the negative effects of an unanticipated productivity shock affecting some or all 
of the sectors in each country. We see that monetary and fiscal policies are efficient tools of 
stabilization in all cases and under several conditions they can replicate the flexible-price 
equilibrium. However, their efficiency is not necessarily increased when both monetary and 
fiscal policy react to shocks at the national level. Our analysis differs from that of Lombardo 
and  Sutherland  by  allowing  sector-specific  productivity  shocks  in  each  country  and  by 
introducing asymmetric uncertainty over shocks across countries. 
    A second purpose of the paper is to evaluate the possible gains from international monetary 
cooperation  and  to  determine  the  impact  of  fiscal  policies  on  the  efficiency  of  monetary 
policies. Our results show that Canzoneri et  al’s conclusion of non-negligible gains from 
monetary cooperation is not unconditional.  
    The paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the general features of the model and 
derives  the  equilibrium  while  section  3  defines  the  policy  objective  function.  Section  4 
discusses the efficiency of fiscal and monetary policies as stabilization tools and section 5 
analyses  the  interactions  between  international  monetary  cooperation  and  fiscal  policies. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The model 
 
    The world exists for a single period and consists of two equally–sized identical countries, 
Home and Foreign, both inhabited by a continuum of consumer-producers with monopoly 
power. Each domestic household has three workers. One of these three workers produces a 
traded good YD(h) to be consumed in the domestic market while the second produces a traded 
good YE (h) to be exported. The third worker produces a non-traded good YN(h).  Each worker 
f of a foreign household also  produces a non-traded  good    ) (
*
* f Y
N , a traded good to be 
consumed in the foreign market  ) (
*
* f Y





2.1. Household preferences 
 
    Home household i maximizes the following utility function: 









i i log log                                                    (1) 
    According to (1), household derives utility from a composite consumption good 
i C  and 
from real balances  P M
i /  where P is the overall price index. The household also bears the disutility of work effort in sector j measured by  j
i
j Z Y /  where j=D, E, N. Implicit to this 
expression is the assumption that one unit of labor produces  j Z  units of output where  j Z  is a 
stochastic variable. An exogenous change in  j Z  represents a productivity shock.  
    The preferences for the foreign representative household are similar. 
    The  composite  domestic  consumption  index C
i  is  a  Cobb-Douglas  aggregator  over  the 
domestically produced tradable goods 
i
D C , imported tradable goods 
i
E C *  and non-tradable 
goods 
i
N C  and is defined as: 
    
1 1 1
3 3 3
* ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i
DN E C C C C                   (2a)  
    The sub-indexes in the overall consumption index are CES aggregators over the goods 
available in each sector and are given as:  




jj C C h dh ,   j=D, N     and 
1 1
1




E       (2b)  
where >1 is the elasticity of substitution between the goods produced within a sector.     
    The composite foreign consumption index and the corresponding sub-indexes are similar to 
equations (2a) and (2b). 
    The  overall  home  and  foreign  price  indexes  P  and 
* P corresponding  to  the  composite 
aggregate  domestic  and  foreign  consumption  C  and 
* C are  defined  as  the  minimum 
expenditure required to purchase one unit of the composite consumption good and are given 
respectively as follows:  
    
1 1 1
3 3 3
* 3 DN E P P P P   and   3
1 * *
* 3




* N P             (3) 
    In the above expressions,  D P   and  N P  are the home currency prices of the domestically-
consumed tradable and non-tradable goods produced at home while  
*
* D P  and 
*
* N P  denote the 
prices  of  the  foreign  tradable  and  non-tradable  goods  expressed  in  the  foreign  currency. 
Similarly,  * E P  stands for the home currency price of the foreign export good whereas 
*
E P  
represents the foreign currency price of the home traded good exported to the foreign country. 
   The corresponding sub-indexes of sectoral domestic and foreign prices are given as: 
    
1
1 1 1
0 () jj P P h dh  for j=D, N, E                (3a) 





* * ) ( * * df f P P
j j  for 
* * * * , , E N D j             (3b)
     Goods prices are fixed in the currency of the producer. Hence, the home currency price of a 
foreign traded good exported to the home country  ) ( * f P
E  and the foreign currency price of a 
home traded good exported to the foreign country  ) (
* h PE  are expressed in the following way 
where e represents the nominal exchange rate (home currency price of one unit of foreign 
currency):  ) ( ) (
*
* * f eP f P
E E   and  e h P h P E E / ) ( ) (
* . Since all firms are identical, we have 
**
*
EE P eP  and  e P P E E /
* at the sectoral level.    
    The home household’s budget constraint is written as follows: 
     ** 0 ( ) ( ) ( )
i i i i i i i i
N N D D D D N N E E EE M P C P C P C PT M P h Y P h Y P h Y      (4) 
    In equation (4),  0
i M  and 
i M  denote  the  initial  and  the  desired  money  holdings  and T 
represents lump sum taxes levied by the government.  
    For simplification purposes we exclude financial markets. 
    The foreign household’s budget constraint is similar to (4) 
 
2.2 Goods demand    
    
    Home (foreign) household’s demand for a single home (foreign) good h (f) produced in 
sectors N and D (N
*and D
*), given below, result from the maximization of consumption 
under the fixed budget constraint: 























f C  for j=D, N and 
* * * ,N D j     (5a)  
    The foreign (home) demand for a single home (foreign) export good is determined in a 
similar way and is expressed as follows:  




















C            (5b) 
    We assume that home and foreign governments have the same preferences as private agents 
but the exported goods sectors in each country are not subject to public demand
1. This implies 
that public and private demands have the same form, with  () j Gh  and  ) (
*
* h G
j  replacing  () j Ch  
and  ) (
*
* h C
j  where j=D, N and 
* j =
* *,N D  
                                                 
1 Trionfetti (2001) points out to the presence of a government home bias in many of the industrialized countries.     Aggregating public and private demand over each sector gives the following expressions 
for a single good produced in a sector at home and abroad: 
























f Y             (6) 
where  j j j Y C G  and  * * *
*
j j j G C Y  for  j=D, N and 
* j =
* *,N D .  
    Because of the home bias assumption, output equals private consumption in the export 
good sectors in each country:  E E C Y  and  * *
*
E E C Y . 
 
2.3 Fiscal authorities 
 
    We assume that ricardian equivalence holds and that in each country, the public spending 
(G, 
* G ) are financed by taxes (T, 
* T ) and by seignoriage revenues: 












G             (7)
 
    Following  Corsetti  and  Pesenti  (2001),  we  define  an  index  of  domestic  government 
spending, g, expressed as the ratio of output net of spending to total output: g = (Y-G)/Y while 
the index of foreign government spending is 
* * * * / ) ( Y G Y g . 
    We  assume  that  in  each  country,  the  fiscal  authority  is  not  interested  in  discretionary 
policies, but reacts to an unanticipated productivity shock. Then we have E(G) = E(G
*)=0 and 
1 ) ( ) (
* g E g E  where E is the expectations operator.  
 
2.4 Household’s optimization problem 
 
    Home household maximizes his utility given in (1) under the budget constraint (4) taking 
equation (6) into account. The foreign household solves the same problem. The first order 
conditions  for  the  three  consumptions  and the money  demand  in  each  country  imply  the 
following expressions where we drop the upper indexes i  and 
* i : 
     ** 3 3 3 N N D D EE PC P C P C P C  and  **
* * * * 3
NN P C P C **
** 3
DD PC
* * 3 E EC P     (8) 
     PC M  and 
* * * C P M                  (9) 
    Home  and  foreign  representative  households  derive  the  following  expression  from  the 
profit  maximization  with  respect  to  individual  prices  under  technology  and  demand 
constraints (see appendix A) :       j j Z C 3




j j Z C                 (10) 
where  j j j g Y C  and 
* * *
j j j g Y C . 
    We  assume  that,  when  prices  are  flexible  fiscal  and  monetary  authorities  are  passive 
implying that  jj CY  and 
* *
j j Y C . The introduction of these equalities into (10) gives the 
following optimal home and foreign labour supplies : 















                (11a) 
where a caret over the variable indicates the flexible price value.  
    When prices are fixed we have the following expected labor supplies:   





















E           (11b) 
    In equations (11),  j Eg =1 in sectors j = N, D  and 
* * *   , D N j and there is no fiscal policy 
in the exportation sectors. 
    Comparison of equations (11) shows that expected employment levels are equal to their 
flexible price values but actual (ex post) employment levels will be determined by sectoral 




    In the present setup current account will always be balanced as pointed out by Corsetti-
Pesenti (2001) because of the unit elasticity of substitution between goods produced at home 
and  abroad  along  with  the  assumption  of  no  international  trade  in  assets.  The  following 
expression gives the home current account balance in terms of domestic currency: 
     **
*
EE EE P C P C                     (12) 
    Combining this outcome with equations (8) and (9) and remembering that 
*
E E eP P  gives 
the equilibrium exchange rate as 
* M M e . 
    Using equations (8) and (9), one can derive output levels and consumption in each sector as 
follows, remembering that  j j j C Y g  and 
* * *
* * * j j j g Y C  for j=N, D and  
* j =
* *,D N : 
















Y  for 
* j =

















Y                   (13b) 






 for j=N, D, 









C  for 
* j = E D N , ,
* *
        (14) 
    According to (13a) and (13b), an increase in home (foreign) public spending leads to an 
immediate increase in home (foreign) output of traded and nontraded goods, since output is 
demand determined when prices are fixed. In contrast, (13b) states that public spending has 
no effect on the output of exported goods because of the home bias assumption.  
    Money supply in each country affects output in all three sectors but the effect is not 
immediate in contrast to public spending. It affects output through its effect on private 
consumption. Indeed, an increase in the home money supply for a constant level of the foreign 
money supply determines a depreciation of the home currency. The increase in the exchange 
rate determines an increase in the price of the foreign imported goods expressed in home 
currency since 
*
* * E E eP P where 
*
* E P  is fixed. The increase in the domestic money supply and 
the  proportional  increase  in  the  exchange  rate  level  leave  the  domestic  imported  goods 
consumption  * E C   constant  according  to  (14).  However,  the  value  of  this  consumption  in 
home currency  * E P * E C  increases proportionally to M and e.  
    Since the home consumption of traded and non traded goods increase also proportionally to 
M with constant prices according to (14), the domestic monetary equilibrium (9) is restored 
through a higher value of PC and of its components defined in (8). 
    In the foreign country, the increase in the exchange rate reduces the price of the imported 
domestic goods expressed in foreign currency as implied by  e P P E E /
* . This increases the 
foreign imported goods consumption 
*
E C  according to (14), but it leaves constant the value of 




E C . 
    The home trade balance defined in domestic currency remains in equilibrium with greater 
imports ( * * E E C P ) and exports (
*
E EC P ). 
 
3. Welfare under fixed and flexible price equilibria 
 
    Under fixed prices, expected home welfare can be derived from (1) as follows where we 
made use of the expected employment level defined from (11b) and of the definition of the Cobb-Douglas domestic consumption index. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) we assume that 
the utility from real balances is negligible: 
     *
11
3
DNE E W Ec Ec Ec               (15) 
where lower case letters denote log variables.  
    After some algebra, it is possible to express the fixed-price (expected) home welfare in 
terms of the flexible-price welfare as follows (see appendix B): 
     1
6 ˆ E W E W
                 
(16a) 
    In equation (16a), the expected welfare under flexible prices  ] ˆ [W E  is defined as follows 
remembering that  ˆˆ jj E y E c :  
     ] ˆ [W E   *
* 1 1
3 ˆ ˆ ˆ DNE Ey Ey Ey               (16b) 
The welfare loss due to price rigidity is expressed as: 
     *
*
D D N N E Var m g z Var m g z Var m z         (16c) 
    A similar derivation for the foreign country yields 
* * * 1
6 ˆ [ ] [ ] E W E W . 
    As implied by (16a) and (16c) and their foreign analogues, policy makers can achieve the 
flexible price level of welfare if they can eliminate the welfare loss caused by the productivity 
shock combined with price rigidity.  
4. Fiscal and monetary policy as stabilization tools  
 
    We would like to assess the efficiency of fiscal and monetary policies as stabilization tools 
and the possible effect of their interaction on their efficiency. The efficiency is measured as 
the capacity to reduce or to eliminate the effects of the shocks on expected welfare.  
    In what follows we will first see the traditional case where all sectors are hit by the same 
shock in each country. Then we will consider two cases where the shock hits one or two 
sectors in each country.  
 
Case 1. Identical shocks  across all sectors in each country: 
     0 z z z z E N D , 0
*
* * * z z z z
E N D ,
2 ) ( z z Var , 
2 *
* ) (
z z Var =
2
z k ,  0 k . 
     Most of the stochastic NOEM models consider this case where there is only one shock in a 
country.  We  assume  that  the  uncertainty  on  the  shocks  may  be  symmetric  ( 1 k )  or 
asymmetric (k 1) across countries. 
    We assume that the fiscal and monetary authorities can react to the productivity shocks 
according following functions: 
     z z m j  and  z z m
j
* * * *
*  for j=D, N, E and for 
* * * *   ,   , E N D j     (17a) 
     j j z g  and 
* * *
* * j j z g  for j=D, N and for 
* * *   , N D j         (17b) 
where 
*  and    denote  respectively  the  home  and  foreign  monetary  policy  reaction 
coefficients while   and 
* denote the fiscal policy reaction coefficients. 
    When, for example, labour productivities  j Z  and 
*
j Z  increase in the three sectors of each 
country, optimally, agents would like to work less for given  j Y  and 
*
j Y  and to consume more, 
according to equations (10). Then the optimality of labour effort implies an increase in real 
wages. However, price rigidity prevents such an adjustment in the labour market.  
    When  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  are  passive  (MPFP),  welfare  losses  are  given  by 
2 ) 2 ( z MPFP k   and 
2 * ) 1 2 ( z MPFP k   according  to  equation  (16c)  and  (17)  where 
0
*  and  0
* . These losses can be reduced or eliminated by active monetary 
and/or fiscal policy. 
    When we allow for active monetary and fiscal policies, the welfare loss functions (16c)  
including (17a) and (17b) take the following form: 
    
* * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( z Var z Var z Var MNFN         (18a) 
     z Var z Var z Var MNFN ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* * * * * * *       (18b) 
where MNFN refers to Nash strategy for both fiscal and monetary authorities.  
 
Proposition  1a.  When  all  sectors  in  each  country  are  hit  by  the  same  shock,  monetary 
policies  alone  (MNFP)  are  more  efficient  with  respect  to  fiscal  policies  alone  (MPFN) 
regardless of the value of k. 
Proof. When fiscal policies are absent ( 0
* ), the minimization of (18a) and (18b) over 
the  monetary policy coefficients gives  = 1
*   which yields  MNFP 0
*
MNFP . When 
monetary policies are passive ( 0
* ), the minimization of (18a) and (18b) over the 
fiscal policy coefficients gives  = 1
*  which yields 
2
z MPFN k  and 
2 *
z MPFN . The comparison  of  welfare  losses  under  both  regimes  shows  that  MNFP MPFN  and 
* *
MPFN MNFP  for all values of k. 
    Monetary authorities can reproduce the flexible-price equilibrium when fiscal policies are 
passive. This result is the same as in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) where there is only one 
shock in both countries. Indeed, an increase in the productivity of home labour reduces the 
marginal utility of leisure. In this case, labour-leisure trade-off is no longer optimal. Monetary 
intervention increases private consumption in each country according to equation (14) and 
restores the optimality of labour-leisure trade-off.  
    Fiscal policy acts through a different mechanism. Indeed, when monetary authorities are 
passive,  optimal  fiscal  policy  requires  increasing  the  public  spending.  With  fixed  prices, 
private consumption is not crowded out following the fiscal expansion as implied by (14) but 
the production increases according to equations (13). This in turn, increases the marginal 
utility of leisure up to the initial level and restores thereby the optimality of labour-leisure 
trade-off.  
Due to the home bias assumption, fiscal authorities react only to shocks that affect the 
production of sectors N, D, 
* N and 
* D . By doing this, fiscal authority eliminates the effects of 
the national shocks in each country, but it cannot react to shocks that affect the production of 
the exported goods. Hence, when there is a single shock in both countries, fiscal policy alone 
can not achieve the flexible-price level of welfare in contrast to monetary policy. 
 
Proposition 1b. When both monetary and fiscal authorities choose to play Nash (MNFN) 
against  identical  shocks  across  all  sectors  in  each  country,  they  are  indifferent  to  any 
combination of the policy reaction coefficients regardless of the value of k. 
Proof. Minimizing (18a) and (18b) over the policy coefficients yields  1
* * . 
This implies that optimal policy coefficients are indeterminate. Then any combination of the 
policy coefficients that results from the monetary and fiscal reactions to the shocks ( 0 1  
and  0 1 ) and satisfies the condition  1
* * will reduce the welfare losses 
whatever the value of  k:  MNFN  
2 2 ) 1 ( z k   MPFPand 
*
MNFN




    Whatever the combination of policy coefficients, monetary and fiscal policy are able to 
eliminate the effects of the shock on nontraded goods  and domestically consumed traded 
goods sectors in the two countries. The effects of the shocks affecting the export goods sector in the two countries can not be eliminated unless the fiscal authorities optimally decide not to 
intervene ( 0
*  and  1
* ) .  
    If the domestic shock has a greater (lower) variance than the foreign implying that  k>1 
(k<1) domestic welfare loss will be higher (lower) relative to foreign.  
 
Case  2.  Specific  shocks  in  traded  goods  sectors  in  each  country  with  no  shocks  in  the 
nontraded goods sector: 
     0 z z z E D , 0
*
* * z z z
E D , 0 * N N z z ,
2 ) ( z z Var ,
2 *
* ) (
z z Var =
2
z k ,  0 k . 
 
    Fiscal  and  monetary  authorities  can  react  to  the  productivity  shocks  according  to  the 
following policy rules: 
     z z m j      and  z z m
j
* * * *
* ; with j=D, E, and 
* * *   , E D j       (19a) 
     z z g D D  and 
* * * * *
* * z z g
D D               (19b) 
    Introducing equations (19a) and (19b) in (16c) gives the f ollowing welfare losses when 
both monetary and fiscal policies are active: 
    
* * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( z Var z Var z Var MNFN           (20a) 
     z Var z Var z Var MNFN ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* * * * * *           (20b) 
    When both policies are passive, the productivity shocks yields the following welfare losses: 
2 ) 1 ( z MPFP k  and 
2 * ) 1 ( z MPFP k . 
 
Proposition 2a. When the shock hits only the traded goods sectors in each country, monetary 
policies alone (MNFP) are more efficient than fiscal policies alone (MPFN) in both countries  
provided that the uncertainty over home and foreign shocks is similar. 
Proof.  Assuming  0
* ,  minimizing  (20a)  and  (20b)  over  the  monetary  policy 
coefficients gives 
* 1
2   which  yields 
2
4
1 ] 2 [ z MNFP k   and 
2
4
1 * ] 1 2 [ z MNFP k . 
Assuming  0
* , minimizing (20a) and 20b) over   and
* gives  = 1
*  which 
yields 
2
z MPFN k  and 
2 *
z MPFN . 




1 ] 2 [ z MNFP k
2




1 * ] 1 2 [ z MNFP k
2 *
z MPFN . The first condition is met for k > 3
2  while the second condition requires k < 2
3 . Then monetary policies alone yield better results in both countries 
compared to fiscal policies when  2
3 > k >  3
2 . This condition implies that the uncertainty over 
home and foreign shocks should not be too asymmetric 
 
    Active monetary or fiscal policies are efficient tools of stabilization for any value of k since 








MPFP. However, the 
value of  k is important when it comes to comparing monetary policy efficiency to that of 
fiscal policy. Indeed, because of the home bias, fiscal policy can not stabilize the export goods 
sector. In contrast, monetary policy can stabilize the export goods sector but it destabilizes the 
nontraded goods sector. If the shock on the export good sector is sufficiently low, the negative 
effect of monetary policy on nontraded goods sector dominates the positive effect on export 
goods sector. In this case fiscal stabilization yields better results because the policy makers 
accept the loss from unstable export good sector in order to avoid any volatility in nontraded 
goods sector. For example when k > 2
3 , the shock on home import goods sector is high which 
implies that home country prefers monetary reaction while foreign country prefers fiscal 
reaction since the shock in foreign import goods is low.  
    In contrast to Case 1, monetary policies cannot reproduce the flexible -price equilibrium 
when fiscal policies are not available. The reason is that, monetary intervention in each 
country has a negative effect on the nontraded goods  sector which is not affected by the 
shock. To reduce this effect, monetary authorities  react less aggressively to shocks, which 
results in an insufficient level of stabilization in the sectors that are hit by the shock. 
    Similarly to Case 1, fiscal policy alone in each country cannot achieve the flexible -price 
equilibrium since fiscal spending has no effect on the imported goods sector because of the 
home bias assumption. This aspect of home bias is rather worth mentioning because in 
traditional deterministic models (Frenkel et al. (2002), chapter 2), home bias is rather 
considered to increase the efficiency of fiscal policy while in this setup it reduces the 
efficiency of fiscal policy.  
 
Proposition 2b. When both monetary and fiscal policies are available, monetary authorities 
in each country optimally choose to stay passive regardless of the value of k assuming that the 
shock hits only the traded goods sectors in each country. Proof.  Minimizing (20a) and 20b) over the monetary and fiscal  policy coefficients  gives 
1
*   and  0
* which yields the following welfare losses:  
2
z MNFN k   and 
2 *
z MNFN  
     
    In this case, monetary authorities optimally choose to stay passive in both countries. The 
reason is that money supply affects all sectors equally. This implies that a monetary reaction 
in one of the countries  has a negative effect on the nontraded goods sector which is not 
affected  by  the  shock.  Moreover,  monetary  policy  is  unnecessary  for  the  domestically 
consumed traded goods sector which is already stabilized by the fiscal authority. Finally, 
home (foreign) monetary intervention affects the foreign (home) export goods sector and not 
the home (foreign) export sector.  
 
Case3. Specific productivity shocks on nontraded goods sectors of the two countries without 
any shocks on any other sector: 
     E D z z 0 * * E D z z ,  0 N z ,  0 * N z , 
2 ) ( N N z Var , 
2
* *) (
N N z Var =
2
N k ,  0 k . 
     
    In case 3, fiscal and monetary authorities can react to the productivity shocks according the 
following functions:  N z m ,  *
*
N z m , N N z g   * *
*
N N z g . 
    Introducing  these  functions    in  (16c)  gives  the  following  welfare  losses  when  both 
monetary and fiscal policies are active: 
     *
* ( 1) MNFN N N N Var z Var z Var z           (21a) 
     **
* * * * ( 1) MNFN N NN Var z Var z Var z           (21b) 
    When monetary and fiscal policy makers do not react to the shocks, welfare decreases in 
the two countries by the amounts 
2
N z MPFP  and 
N z MPFP k
* .  
 
Proposition 3. When there is a shock on the nontraded goods sector in each country, fiscal 
policy  alone  can  reproduce  the  flexible-price  equilibrium  in  both  countries  contrary  to 
monetary policy. 
Proof.  Assuming  0
* , minimization of (21a) and (21b) over  α  and 
*  gives the 
optimal policy fiscal policy coefficients   as 1
*   which yields 
* 0 MPFN MPFN . Assuming  0
* , the minimization of (21a) and (21b) with respect to   and 
* yields 
* 1














N z k    
 
    Since there are no shocks in the export goods sector in the foreign country, in contrast to 
Case 1, fiscal policies are capable of achieving the flexible-price solution when monetary 
policies are not available. In contrast, monetary policy can not eliminate the welfare loss 
implying a lower efficiency with respect to fiscal policy.  
    There  are  two  reasons  for  the  lower  efficiency  of  monetary  policies  alone.  First,  the 
nonseparable  character  of  money  supply  causes  a  destabilization  in  sectors  that  are  not 
affected by the shocks. Second, the negative spillover effect increases the relative inefficiency 
of  monetary  policy.  This  negative  spillover  effect  comes  from  the  fact  that  the  foreign 
monetary  authority destabilizes  the home consumption  of imported goods  while trying to 
stabilize foreign consumption of foreign nontraded goods following a shock in this sector.  
    As in Case 2, monetary authority optimally chooses not to react when fiscal policies are 
active. Indeed, a monetary intervention in the nontraded goods sector is unnecessary since 
fiscal  intervention  has  already  eliminated  the  effects  of  the  shock.  Moreover,  monetary 
intervention has negative effects on the sectors that are not affected by the shock.  
5. International policy cooperation gains 
 
    Because of the government home bias assumption, fiscal policies do not react to the shocks 
on the export goods sectors. Hence they have no role on the stabilization of these sectors 
according to (16c). In this case, there is no fiscal interdependence between countries and 
fiscal  cooperation  is  useless.  In  contrast,  uncoordinated  monetary  policies  yield  spillover 
effects which can be internalized by international cooperation.  
    There are two questions that we will try to answer in this section: first, can cooperative 
strategy increase the efficiency of monetary policy with respect to the Nash game and second, 
what are the effects of active fiscal policy on the efficiency of cooperative monetary policy?  
    As in the previous section we will consider three different cases. 
 
Case 1 : Identical shocks across all sectors in each country : 
     0 z z z z E N D , 0
*
* * * z z z z
E N D ,
2 ) ( z z Var , 
2 *
* ) (
z z Var =
2
z k ,  0 k . 
     In  what  follows,  gains  from  international  monetary  cooperation  will  be  evaluated  with 
respect to gains from monetary stabilization where monetary authorities choose Nash strategy 
while fiscal authorities may play Nash game or stay passive. 
 
Proposition  4.  When  monetary  authorities  cooperate  internationally  against  identical 
productivity  shocks  across  all  sectors  in  each  country,  there  are  additional  gains  from 
monetary  cooperation  if  fiscal  authorities  are  active.  These  cooperation  gains  disappear 
either when fiscal authorities optimally choose to stay passive or when fiscal policies are not 
available. 
 Proof.  When  monetary  authorities  cooperate  while  fiscal  policies  adopt  a  Nash  strategy 
(MCFN), they minimize the following function derived from (18a) and (18b) with respect to 
and 
* for given fiscal policies: 
     z Var z Var z Var
z Var z Var z Var
MCFN
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2
1
* * * *
*
      (22) 
    The  fiscal authority of each country minimizes the following equations for a given 
monetary policy:  
    
* * ) 1 ( ) 1 ) 1 ( z Var z Var z Var MCFN         (23a) 
     z Var z Var z Var MCFN ) 1 ( ) 1 ) 1 (
* * * * * * * *       (23b) 
    Combining the reaction functions resulting from the game above yields 
* 1  and 
* 0  which  implies  0
*
MCFN MCFN . Comparing this r esult to the welfare loss 
under MNFN game shows that 
* *
MCFN MCFN MNFN MNFN   when fiscal authorities are 
active in the Nash game implying that  0
*  and  1
* . However, when  0
*  
and  1
*  implying that fiscal authority optimally chooses to stay passive under Nash 
game, we have  0
* *
MCFN MCFN MNFN MNFN . Moreover, when monetary authorities 
cooperate while fiscal policies are not available ( 0
* ), they minimize (22) with respect 
to  and 
*. This gives  1






    Monetary  cooperation  yields  no  additional  gains  with  respect  to  monetary  stabilization 
gains when fiscal policies are not available. The reason is that as in Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2002), international risk sharing is perfect since home (foreign) monetary authority fully 
stabilizes  the  foreign  (home)  consumption  of  home  (foreign)  goods.  Then  monetary authorities  can  aim  at  reproducing  the  flexible-price  equilibrium  both  under  Nash  and 
cooperative  games.  Moreover,  as  in  Lombardo-Sutherland  (2004),  fiscal  policies  have  no 
impact on monetary policy efficiency in a cooperative equilibrium since  MCFP MCFN  and 
* *
MCFP MCFN . 
 
Case  2:  Specific  shocks  in  traded  goods  sectors  in  each  country  with  no  shocks  in  the 
nontraded goods sector: 
     0 z z z E D , 0
*
* * z z z
E D , 0 * N N z z ,
2 ) ( z z Var ,
2 *
* ) (
z z Var =
2
z k ,  0 k . 
 
    When there is no uncertainty on the productivity level in one of the sectors, in contrast to 
Case 1, monetary policy faces a trade-off between sectors. Moreover, cooperative strategy 
allows monetary authorities to internalize the spillover effects that result from home (foreign) 
monetary reaction on foreign (home) consumption of home (foreign) goods. This implies the 
possibility of additional gains from international monetary cooperation.  
 
Proposition  5a.  When  fiscal  policy  is  not  available,  both  countries  gain  from  monetary 
cooperation against productivity shocks in traded goods sectors provided that the uncertainty 
on the shocks are not too asymmetric across countries. 
Proof.  When  monetary  authorities  internationally  cooperate  while  fiscal  policies  are  not 
available (MCFP), they minimize the following loss function with respect to  and 
* given 
the monetary rules defined in (19a): 
    
z Var z Var z Var
z Var z Var z Var






          (24) 
    The resulting home and foreign policy reaction coefficients are  3 / 2
*  which yield: 
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    The gains from monetary cooperation with respect to the monetary Nash strategy are given 
by: 
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1 * * ) ( ) (
k
z z MCFP MNFP k k >0 when  2
5 k  
    The above equations show that there are cooperation gains from monetary policy alone for 
both countries when  2
5 >k> 5
2 .     When the variance of the home shock is relatively large with respect to the variance of the 
foreign shock (k< 5
2 ), cooperative monetary policy is beneficial only to the foreign country. 
When  2
5 k , only the home country benefits from monetary cooperation.  
     
    In  the  cooperative  case,  monetary  authorities  internalize  the  positive  externalities 
concerning  the  import  goods  sector  in  each  country.  Hence,  monetary  reaction  is  more 
aggressive under cooperation with respect to Nash response. This, in turn, leads to a higher 
stabilization of the domestically consumed traded goods  sectors with  respect  to  the Nash 
strategy. The positive effect of higher stabilization on welfare is higher than the negative 
effect of the destabilization of nontradable goods sectors in both countries as long as  2
5 >k> 5
2 .  
    
Proposition  5b.  Active  fiscal  policy  in  each  country  may  enhance  the  efficiency  of 
international monetary cooperation depending on the value of k.   
Proof. When monetary authorities internationally cooperate while fiscal authorities choose a 
Nash strategy (MCFN), they minimize the following loss function with respect to  and 
* 
taking the fiscal strategy as given : 
     z Var z Var z Var
z Var z Var z Var
MCFN
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
2
1
* * * * *
* *
        (25)
 
    Fiscal authorities in each country minimize the following welfare losses with respect to   
and 
* taking the reaction of monetary authorities as given : 
    
* * ) 1 ( ) 1 ( z Var z Var z Var MCFN           (26a) 
     z Var z Var z Var MCFN ) 1 ( ) 1 (
* * * * * *           (26b) 
    Combining  the  reaction  functions  resulting  from  the  game  above  yields 
** 11
22 ,  . Then we have  ) 1 (
2
4
1 k z MCFN  and  ) 1 (
2
4
1 * k z MCFN .  
    The gains generated by international monetary cooperation when fiscal authorities play 
Nash relative to the gains from monetary and fiscal Nash strategies is given by: 






 >0 when  5
11 k  






 >0 when  11
5 k  
    According  to  these  equations,  monetary  cooperation  yields  a  higher  welfare  loss  with 
passive than with active fiscal policies in both countries when  11
5
5
11 k .  
    The previous section showed that monetary authorities choose to stay passive when fiscal 
authorities are active under the Nash game. In contrast, under cooperation they are induced to 
react to shocks since there are gains to exploit.  The reason is that, although monetary reaction 
without  fiscal  intervention  does  not  eliminate  the  effects  of  the  shock  on  domestically 
consumed traded goods sector, it leads to a higher response compared to the case when fiscal 
policy plays Nash. Indeed, the home and foreign monetary reaction coefficients are equal to 
3
2  when fiscal policy is not available instead of  2
1  when fiscal authority is active. This 
implies that the negative effects of t he monetary reaction on the nontraded goods sector are 
higher in the former case. On the other hand, the positive effect on the export goods sector is 
also higher. The negative effect dominates the positive effect depending on the values of  k 
and cooperative monetary policy leads to a higher welfare loss when fiscal policy is absent. 
    When  fiscal  policy  is  absent,  either  home  or  foreign  monetary  authority  looses  from 
cooperation if the uncertainty on shocks is too asymmetric across countries ( 3
1 k or  3 k ). 
The reason is that, the gains from the internalization of the positive externalities are too small 
with respect to the cost of the destabilization of non traded goods sectors. 
 
Case 3. Identical shocks in nontraded goods sector without any shocks on any other sector. 
0 z   ,   0   , 0 * * * D
*
E D E N N z z z z z z z ,
2 ) ( z z Var ,
2 *
* ) (
z z Var =
2
z k ,  0 k . 
 
    Section 4 already showed that under Case 3, fiscal policy alone is capable of reproducing 
the  flexible-price  level  of  welfare  in  both  countries.  Hence,  monetary  authorities  choose 
optimally  to  stay  passive  whenever  fiscal  policy  is  available.  Since  fiscal  Nash  regime 
achieves the flexible-price level of welfare fiscal authorities expect no additional gains from 
international cooperation. In contrast, there may be gains from monetary cooperation when 
fiscal policies are not available. 
 
Proposition  6.  In  the  absence  of  fiscal  policy,  both  countries  gain  from  international 
monetary  cooperation  against  productivity  shocks  in  nontraded  goods  provided  that  the 
uncertainty over shocks is not too asymmetric across countries. 
Proof. When monetary authorities choose to cooperate while fiscal policy is not available, 
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which yields  3 / 1
* . This implies that 
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    The gains generated by monetary cooperation with respect to the monetary Nash strategy 
are given by: 





1 ) 5 ( ) 1 (
N z z
k
MCFP MNFP k = 0 2 5k  when  5
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    Monetary cooperation is beneficial for both countries if  2
5
5
2 k .    
 
    When  2
5
5
2 k , monetary cooperation induces both monetary authorities to internalize 
their negative effect on the export goods sector of the other country and thereby to reduce 
their reactions. The reaction coefficients  and 
*  are equal to 1/3 under cooperation instead 
of 1/2 under Nash. This implies that the positive effect of monetary policy on nontraded 
goods sector is lower under cooperati on relative to the Nash game. On the other hand, the 
negative effects on the other sectors are also lower. The second effect dominates the first one 
and monetary cooperation yields a lower welfare loss compared to the monetary Nash game. 
However, these gains disappear when fiscal authority becomes active.  
    When  k> 2
5   or    k< 5




    The present paper offers a static stochastic model of NOEM with three production sectors 
in order to analyze monetary and fiscal policy efficiency against productivity shocks as well 
as to analyze international policy cooperation. The setup allows also to consider the impact of 
monetary policy on fiscal policy efficiency and vice-versa.  
    The assumption of three production sectors allows for a possibility of different shocks in 
different sectors. This implies that when some of the sectors are hit by a shock while others 
are not affected, monetary authority in each country faces a trade-off between stabilizing the 
sectors that are hit and destabilizing the sectors that are not affected by the shock. Contrary to 
the monetary authority, fiscal authorities do not face such a trade-off since they can intervene separately in each sector. However, they suffer from an instrument insufficiency because they 
can not affect the consumption of exported goods due to the home bias assumption. 
    We begin with the case where all sectors are hit by the same shock, which corresponds to 
the case studied in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) or Lombardo and Sutherland (2004). Then we 
consider two other cases in each of which the shock affects some of the sectors while other 
sectors are not affected. We also allow for an internationally asymmetric structure regarding 
the variance of the shocks.   
    The results show that, in contrast to case 1, monetary policy alone can not reproduce the 
flexible-price  equilibrium  under  cases  2  and  3.  Furthermore,  active  fiscal  policy  reduces 
monetary policy efficiency under case 1 whereas the latter chooses optimally to stay passive 
under cases 2 and 3. Finally, monetary policy alone is more efficient with respect to fiscal 
policy alone under cases 1 and 2, while fiscal policy alone proves to be more efficient than 
monetary policy alone under case 3. 
    When the uncertainty over shocks is not too asymmetric across countries, both countries 
gain from international monetary cooperation. Active fiscal policy increases the gains from 
monetary cooperation under case 2. However, under case 3, there are gains from monetary 
cooperation only when fiscal policy is passive. When the uncertainty over shocks is highly 
asymmetric across countries, monetary cooperation is counter-productive either for the home 
or for the foreign country and Nash strategy yields better results.  
    The model does not allow for the analysis of international fiscal policy cooperation because 
of the international fiscal interdependence structure. Indeed, the assumption of home bias in 
public spending prevents any interaction between home and foreign fiscal authority. However, 
the assumption of home bias is necessary in order to create an interaction between monetary 
and fiscal authorities. Indeed, there would probably be no need for monetary policy if fiscal 
authorities could intervene in all sectors in the same way. Nevertheless, it may be possible to 
create a link between fiscal authorities in each country while keeping the assumption of home 
bias  in  public  spending.  One  possible  way  of  doing  this  would  be  to  assume  that  fiscal 
authorities can impose a distortionary tax on the output of exported goods in each country. In 
such a setup, fiscal authority of one country would be able to adjust its production of export 
goods by the amount required to stabilize the consumption of the other country, which would 
give rise to possible cooperation gains. 
 
 Appendix A. Expected level of labour supply 
 
    The  pricing  decision  of  the  representative  domestic  household  producing  good  j=N,D 
results from the maximization of its profits under the demand and technology constraints: 
     ) ( ) (   and   ) ( ) (    s.t.
) ( ) ( ) ( max
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j j j h Pj
             
(A.1) 
where  ) (h Y
d
j  is given by equations (6) and   is the shadow price of labour in an econom y 
where each agent is consumer-producer. This price is measured by  1  where   is the  
Lagrange  multiplier  associated  to  the  individual  budget  constraint.  Technically,   results 
from the maximization of utility (1) under the budget constraint (4) taking equation (6) into 
account. The resulting   measures the marginal consumption utility of the three goods: 
    
N NP C 3
1
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1               (A.2) 
    Solving the problem given in A.1 making use of A.2 yields equation (10) for domestic 
country in the text:  j j Z C 3
1 . Introducing  j j j C Y g  in equation (10) gives the optimal 
domestic labour supply. 
 
Appendix B. Expected home welfare 
 
 
    Taking the log of home expected labor supply when prices are flexible (11a) and fixed 
(11b) assuming that all the variables are lognormally distributed, we get: 
     1
3 ˆ log jj yz                     (B.1) 
     1 1
23 log / log j j j j j j E Y Z E y z Var y z           (B.2) 
    Putting  equation  (B.1)  into  the  expectations  operator  and  remembering  that  0 j Ez  
yields  1
3 ˆ log j Ey . Combining this expression with equation (B.2) gives: 
     1
2 ˆ j j j j Ey Ey Var y z                 (B.3) 
    In order to create a link between output and consumption in equation (15), we take the 
expectations of the log of  j j j C Y g . Then using equations (13a) and (13b), we get: 
    
] [
2
1 ˆ j j j j z g m Var y E Ec ;   j=N, D             (B.4)      ] [
2
1 ˆ * * *
* *
E E E z m Var y E Ec                 (B.5) 
    Introducing  equations  (B.4)  and  (B.5)  into  equation  (15)  gives  the  expression  for  the 
expected home welfare as follows: 
**
** 1 11
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